India’s aviation scenario according to Willie Walsh former Director General of IATA

In August this year Willie Walsh will take over the helm of Indigo from Peter Elbers. Speaking to BBC News on the Indian civil aviation scene he affirmed the scale of opportunity for Airlines to grow despite the current pain. There is a disappointment he said due to profiteering from the sale of sustainable fuel during these times of jet fuel shortage and India as a large importer should learn from the lessons of disruption in oil supply due to global conflicts. Walsh said more investments are required in the area of renewable energy as a way to address energy security. He expressed surprise at only 50 wide-body aircrafts in the country of 1.5 billion people and large geography and that India should be looking at having direct International long-haul flights with more wide-body aircraft

From the archives - Revision of memory

Introduction (Link) 

Scheduled air services in India began in October 1932 under the Aviation Department of Tata Sons Ltd, which was succeeded by Tata Airlines. This was subsequently renamed in July 1946 as Air India Ltd., and incorporated as Air India International Ltd. in March 1948. 

In 1953, the Air Corporations Act was passed. Air India International Ltd. was nationalised, and two corporations came into existence – Indian Airlines Corporation (as the national domestic carrier) and Air India (as the international carrier). In 1994, the Air Corporations Act was repealed, and Air India Ltd. (AIL) and Indian Airlines Ltd. (IAL) were incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. 

Government-owned airlines dominated the Indian aviation industry till the mid-1990’s, when, as part of the open sky policy, the Government of India (GoI) ended the monopoly of AIL and IAL in air transport services, and allowed private operators to provide air transport services. 

In March 2007, National Aviation Company of India Ltd. (NACIL) was incorporated. The scheme of amalgamation of Air India Ltd. and Indian Airlines Ltd. into NACIL was approved in August 2007, with the “appointed” date of the merger being set as 1 April 2007. Subsequently, in November 2010, NACIL was renamed as Air India Ltd. (AI). The administrative Ministry for these Government airline(s) is the Ministry of Civil Aviation (MoCA). 

Notes: 

Throughout this report, the abbreviations ‘AIL’ and ‘IAL’ are used to refer to the erstwhile Air India Ltd. and Indian Airlines Ltd. (pre-merger entities). 

The abbreviation ‘AI’ is used to refer to the merged entity.

(from the Performance Audit Report on Civil Aviation in India )

From the archives - Performance Audit Report of Civil Aviation - 2

This Performance Audit Report has been prepared for submission to the President of India under Article 151 of the Constitution. 

The Report is a Performance Audit of civil aviation sector in India which includes NACIL (Air India Limited as it is known today), the Ministry of Civil Aviation (MoCA) and the Bilateral Agreements concluded by Government of India with other governments on entitlements for international operations between India and their countries, as well as permissions given to private Indian carriers to operate on international routes. The Performance Audit was commenced in September 2009 and would have concluded in 2010, but for the fact that reasons for non-performance/losses incurred by Air India Limited were inconclusive without examining the role and extent of support/control by MoCA. Air India repeatedly stated that the government's decision to award profitable routes to private Indian carriers and international carriers vide bilateral agreements also adversely impacted their commercial viability. Hence, to ensure a holistic study, we had to examine the open sky policy of the government which also included bilateral agreements with other countries. This examination was carried out in late 2010 and early 2011. 

At each stage of the audit process, our findings have been shared with AIL and MoCA. The first draft of the performance audit was issued to the Ministry in November 2010 and a second draft report in March 2011. The final draft incorporating the results of the audit of bilateral agreements was issued to the MoCA in July 2011. The replies received from the AIL and Ministry have been incorporated in the Report. Deliberations held in the exit rd conference on 3 August 2011 have also been addressed adequately. 

Audit wishes to acknowledge the cooperation received from IAL, AIL and the MoCA at each stage of the audit process.

What does our performance audit cover?  (Link)

We took up the performance audit to ascertain: 

Whether the acquisition of aircraft by the erstwhile Air India Ltd. (AIL) and Indian Airlines Ltd. (IAL) was appropriately planned and effectively implemented, with due regard to economy, efficiency and accepted norms of financial propriety; 

Whether the merger of AIL and IAL into NACIL was properly planned and effectively implemented, and the effectiveness of merged operations of the two entities; 

the impact of the liberalised policy of the Government of India (GoI) from 2004-05 onwards on grant of air traffic rights to other countries through Air Services Agreements (ASAs)/ “bilateral” agreements, and permitting Indian private carriers to fly on international routes;

The main reasons for the poor financial and operational performance of the premerger airlines and the merged entity; and 

Whether the Ministry of Civil Aviation (MoCA) exercised its oversight role adequately and effectively.

From the archives - Arun Shourie on Indian Airlines Disinvestment - August 27, 2001

New Delhi: The government said on monday it has not tried to find out why bidders like air france-delta airlines, swiss air group and emirates - who had submitted expressions of interest (eoi) for disinvestment of air-india - withdrew from the process thereafter. in a written reply in rajya sabha, minister of state for disinvestment arun shourie said these three bidders had in fact submitted their eois and obtained bid packs but withdrew later without assigning any reason.

On whether the government had tried to find out the reasons for these bidders' loss of interest in the disinvestment process, the minister replied in the negative. replying to another question, shourie denied that the withdrawal of these bidders was in any way related to the draft shareholders' agreement and share purchase agreement for ai disinvestment, saying "the parties who withdrew from the bidding process did so for their own internal reasons and they did not mention the conditions of the draft shareholders' agreement and share purchase agreement as the reasons for theor withdrawal". he said british airways-quantas had also expressed interest in the initial stages of a-i disinvestment but did not confirm its participation and later withdrew. tata-sia: on the issue of tata-singapore airline being the sole bidder left for a-i, the minister said it was not uncommon under standard government procedures to accept single bid offers provided the bidding process was duly advertised and the offer received found to be competitive. "to ensure competitiveness (even in the likelihood of a single bid offer) the reserve price of the government would be determined through an objective evaluation process," he said. hci: in reply to another question, shourie said there was no proposal to insert a clause in air-india shareholder's agreement stipulating that proceeds from the sale of its subsidiary, the hotel corporation of india (hci), would accrue proportionately to a-i's shareholders on the latter's privatisation. cmc: shourie said due diligence has been completed by parties interested in the disinvestment process of cmc ltd and both, the shareholder and the share purchase agreements, are ready.

No idea why other AI bidders withdrew Shourie

From the archives - Air-India $7 bn order to Boeing stirs a cocktail of controversy on Indian political theatre

The $7 billion, 50 aircraft Air-India order bagged by Boeing has stirred a cocktail of controversy. As lobbyists, politicians and diplomats level charges, geopolitics as geoeconomics makes its appearance on the Indian theatre.

Billion Dollar Spat

The setting could not have been more dramatic. It was the launch party of Vijay Mallya's Kingfisher Airlines in Mumbai. As Civil Aviation Minister Praful Patel walked in he bumped into Dinesh Trivedi, Rajya Sabha member. As Trivedi greeted him, Patel kept his smile but uncorked a bottle of sarcasm: "I am still figuring out the percentages. As I count the zeros I wonder what I will do with the money.”

The allusion was clearly on Trivedi's letter to the prime minister, alleging wrong doing in the Rs 30,000 crore Air-India-Boeing deal. The sarcasm was not lost and Trivedi suggested that Patel not take things personally but "share the wealth with friends”.

Patel obviously didn't reach for his cheque book. Elsewhere in the room Nigel Harwood, vice-president (sales), Airbus Industrie, had reason to be happy since Kingfisher had ordered 30 A320s but the presence of Dinesh Keskar, senior vice-president (sales), Boeing, somehow took the fizz out of the bubbly. 

Just last month Boeing-with the 50-aircraft Air-India order-walked-off with the biggest deal in Indian civil aviation history.

The acrimony, the chill in the air despite the bonhomie and the biting sarcasm were not without reason. The A-I proposal is the single biggest order placed by any Indian entity (public or private in civil or defence procurement) to a single company. 

The French disappointment was understandable. Having sunk over $12 billion in its 555-seater A380 aircraft project, it needed orders. Unfortunately in the past 12 months, Boeing has worsted Airbus. As Keskar crows, "Airbus has consistently come up short of the competition." 

Boeing has sold 255 Boeing 787s to 20 customers as against Airbus' 154 Airbus A380s to 15 carriers. It also lost out on recent big deals with Korean Air and Air Canada. Not surprisingly, even the cool diplomatic types lost their shirt. 

French Ambassador to India Dominique Girard went on to suggest that "factors other than 'commercial' had played a role" in Boeing bagging the deal-only to be pulled up by Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran. The suggestion was that the US Government had managed the order.

Twice the board had endorsed Airbus aircraft for its fleet up gradation. As late as November 24, 2004, the A-I board approved floating of tenders to invite offers for acquisition of 50 aircraft from the Airbus stable, including A340-500, A340-600 and A330-200. 

So what has changed between November 24 and April 26, 2005 is what Trivedi is asking. As is Airbus. "Business environment," says A-I Chairman and Managing Director Vasudevan Thulasidas. "The airline reviewed its fleet requirement with emerging trends in traffic growth and passenger needs. We needed 250-seaters to fly non-stop to the US, 350-seaters for long-haul flights and 250-seaters for other destinations. So A-I called for new RFPs (request for proposal) and Airbus did bid along with Boeing," he adds.

The fact is that it is not only the business environment that has changed. Since his re-election in November 2004 George W. Bush has been pursuing and pushing the next step in strategic partnership first discussed during the NDA regime in 2003. Between the installation of the UPA Government in 2004 and April 2005 there have been several high-level meetings between India and the US, including a visit by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Transportation Secretary Norman Y. Mineta, with trade as one of the cornerstones. 

Mineta revealed during his India visit on April 14 that "President Bush had spoken to Manmohan Singh about the aircraft deal and the subject was raised again when Praful Patel visited the US in January". Clearly the case for Boeing has been well argued for by the Bush regime. Also, India's concerns on the backlash against outsourcing in the last US polls have led to some re-thinking on the matter. It also helped that for sometime now all government procurement exceeding Rs 100 crore has to pass through the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).

Even at the WTO, India has opposed transparency in government procurement since its stated policy is to use its market size effectively as an instrument of conducting geopolitics. Changing geopolitics clearly helped Boeing's cause. But then as is the convention in India when it comes to public procurement, conspiracy theories abound even as lobbyists play conscience keepers to the nation. 

So, in Parliament and outside figures and percentages were bandied about as possible kickbacks. One lobbyist even had the exact figure of Rs 1,800 crore plus Rs 450 crore as the possible commission even though the deal is yet to be signed and has to pass through three more filters before it is inked.

Charting A New Flight Plan

But that hasn't stopped politicians from trading letters. Last week even as the parliamentary consultative committee on civil aviation flayed Airbus for its utterances, MPs (Trivedi and seven others) shot off letters to Manmohan and Congress President Sonia Gandhi. It helps that some Congressmen, battling the NCP (of which Patel is a leader) in Maharashtra, suspect Patel's boss Sharad Pawar of trying to engineer a Third Front.

Patel scoffs at such fears but is concerned: "I told theprimeminister that I don't want my name sullied and asked for the oversight committee and reference to the CVC and the CAG before any order is placed."

As the two sides and lobbysts battle it out AI and IA run the risk of failing to upgrade their fleet yet again. Half of AI's fleet is on lease and the 10-year-old Boeing 747 Velha Goa is the youngest aircraft owned by Air-India. Through the 1990s the noxious mix of politics and corporate lobbyists thwarted five A-I chiefs and six civil aviation ministers from getting the airlines new wings. 

Such is the national carrier's fate that it earns nearly Rs 300 crore a year for not flying as it earns from code-sharing agreements with 45 airlines which operate 235 flights a week (that is 12,220 flights a year). Ditto has been the fate of IA. It last bought aircraft in 1986 and has to compete with Jet Airways and Sahara with aircraft that are over 20 years old.

Hopefully this time around as geopolitics helps economics thwart politics, IA and AI may just yet find the wings to take off once again.

Published By: AtMigration 

Published On: May 23, 2005 00:00 IST 

The Boeing Deal - A backgrounder

Some Important Links

Boeing Scandal Part of Deeper Problems at Pentagon

America’s Strategic Opportunity with India

When Condoleezza Rice visited India in March 2005, shortly after taking office as secretary of state, she set out to lay a new cornerstone for the transformed relationship. 

Natural Allies

As the United States and India look ahead to a new kind of partnership, we in the U.S. government should not forget that the big breakthrough in U.S.-India relations was achieved originally by the private sector. The strength of that private-sector engagement ensures that the change now under way is real -- and will last. In many respects, both governments are playing catch-up with the extraordinary business-led trade and investment growth of the last two decades. Since 1991 -- the year of the launch of the economic reforms in India -- trade between the United States and India has grown more than sixfold, reaching $32 billion in 2006. Boeing alone sold $11 billion worth of aircraft last year to India, one of the world's fastest-growing aviation markets.

From the archives - The Boeing Deal - John Cherian

Air-India's decision to go in for Boeing aircraft causes much heartburning in some European governments, which complain that Airbus was not given a fair chance by the Indian authorities.

THE Indian government's decision to purchase 50 Boeing aircraft to replenish Air-India's fleet has not gone down well in many European capitals, especially Paris and Brussels. The European consortium Airbus Industrie was hoping for a slice of the lucrative Air-India contract. The Indian carrier will now buy eight B777-200 LR, 15 B777-300 ER and 27 B787 Dreamliner medium-capacity, long-range aircraft. The deal is worth around $7 billion. In the same week, the Chinese government also came to Boeing's rescue by placing a substantial order for its South China Airways. The new contracts Boeing has bagged have provided a boost for the mid-size "Dreamliner", which is pitted against the Airbus' A380 super jumbo. Both aircraft will be ready for commercial operations only in three to four years.

The new deals may also help Boeing to regain the top slot in the commercial aviation business. The Americans and the Europeans have been engaged in cutthroat competition since the 1980s. In recent years, Airbus Industrie had stolen a march over Boeing. The American company had become virtually dependent on orders from the booming aviation sector in China for survival. Beijing doled out orders to both Boeing and Airbus, managing to keep both Washington and Brussels happy.

The European anger may have been compounded by the fact that India's decision to opt for Boeing was announced immediately after Airbus had successfully test-flown its new super jumbo, the A-380, in the last week of April. Before the Boeing deal was clinched, there was hectic lobbying by American and European officials with their Indian counterparts. According to one report, United States President George W. Bush had a telephonic conversation with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh requesting India to consider the offer from Boeing sympathetically.

The Congress-led United Progressive Alliance government has opted for continuity in aviation deals as it has done in the case of defence deals. There is also talk that the Boeing deal was expedited in the hope that the U.S. would support India's candidature for the United Nations Security Council. Bush administration officials have been complaining for some time that India is not doing enough for the U.S. despite the surge of Indian Information Technology exports to the U.S. The Indian trade surplus with the U.S. has almost trebled over the past decade, reaching $15.6 billion. The imports from the U.S. amount to $6.1 billion.

According to European diplomats, India signed the Boeing deal without getting anything concrete in return from the U.S. They say that one of the factors that could have swung the Air-India deal the Boeing way was the paltry promise of more U.S. work visas for Indians. They also think that the Indian establishment is inherently pro-U.S., given the fact that close relatives of many top officials and politicians are working, residing or studying in the U.S. "In the long-standing battle in the Indian government between those who feel repulsion at Washington and those who feel attraction to it, attraction is winning out," The Financial Times quoted a French diplomat resident in New Delhi.

Senior Congress party office-bearers, however, say that there were no political or other considerations involved in the deal with Boeing. The deal, according to them, was done after a careful study of Air-India's requirements. They say that the Air-India fleet predominantly consists of planes from the Boeing stable. That Air-India's engineers and technicians are trained to handle Boeing planes is another argument making the rounds. Anyway, they say, Airbus had no reason to complain, as it has been awarded the contract to upgrade the Indian Airlines fleet. Praful Patel has said that the decision was not based on geopolitical considerations. He also insisted that his Ministry had not influenced the Air-India Board. He said in the Lok Sabha that the Airbus allegations "are baseless and not based on facts". He went on to add: "[E]qual opportunities were given to both aircraft manufacturers for submitting competitive bids.”

However, according to Airbus Industrie vice-president Nigel Harwood, the company was not given "fair and equal treatment". While expressing "astonishment" at the Indian government's decision, the Airbus official pointed out that the B787 short-listed by Air-India, was still on the drawing board. Harwood told the media in New Delhi that his company was not given a chance to make a presentation on the A380 while Boeing made its case on the B787. The B787 Dreamliner is not expected to fly before 2007. Harwood called for an inquiry by the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC).

"We are questioning how the evaluation was done. We feel that it was not fair and are astonished at the decision. It is a massive blow to us," said Harwood. A technical committee of the Air-India Board had recommended in 2002 both Boeing and Airbus planes. The BJP-led government delayed the procurement after being subjected to intense lobbying from the U.S. However, as recently as November 2004, the Air-India Board broadly endorsed the Technical Committee's recommendations and announced that it was proposing the purchase of 10 Airbus-340 long-haul aircraft and 18-Boeing 737-800 medium-range planes.

The government reacted strongly to the reported comments of the French Ambassador, Dominique Girard, about the unfairness of the deal. The diplomat was quoted as saying that "factors other than commercial" seemed to have clinched the deal. The Press Trust of India had reported that the French Ambassador feared that the proposed defence deal involving the purchase of 126 fighter jets would meet a similar fate. There is hectic lobbying going on by the Americans, the French and the Russians for the sale of fighter jets. F-16s and Mirage-2000s are the current front-runners. The Russians have offered to set up an assembly line in India for the co-production of MiG-29s.

The U.S. has a propensity to impose sanctions on countries. Iran has to buy spare parts for its Boeing in the international grey market to keep Iran Air's planes flying. The late Shah of Iran had opted for Boeing planes. The French Ambassador was quoted as saying that the Europeans are reliable suppliers of spare parts and adhere to contracts, even if serious political differences arise. According to observers of the diplomatic scene, it would have been inconceivable for the U.S. Ambassador in New Delhi to keep quiet if Air-India had opted for Airbus planes instead of Boeing aircraft. The stakes are exceedingly high. The American Ambassador recently told the Indian media that Washington was not happy with the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline as the U.S. had imposed economic sanctions against Iran. There was no official reaction from the government in response to the U.S. diplomat's statement. The Ambassador has been treated by the Indian government for some time as the primus inter pares in the diplomatic community in New Delhi.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is said to have also lobbied strongly for Boeing as she did for Lockheed Martin, the manufacturers of F-16s. Both Boeing and Lockheed Martin are pillars of the U.S. military-industrial complex. U.S. Secretary for Transportation Norman Mineta was in New Delhi in early April to lobby for Boeing. A day before Air-India announced the decision to go with Boeing, French Transport Minister Giles de Robien had a meeting with Civil Aviation Minister Praful Patel to push the case for Airbus Industrie. Thomas Pickering, who was a former U.S. Ambassador to India, had come to New Delhi two years ago to lobby for Boeing when the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government was in power. Following his visit, the government at that time gave strong indications that Air-India would opt predominantly for a Boeing fleet. The other state-owned company, Indian Airlines, was given the green signal to go in for new Airbus planes. Many of the private carriers that have come up in recent years have also signed deals for the purchase of short-range Airbus aircraft.

Link to the article Published : Jun 03, 2005 00:00 IST

From the archives - Performance Audit Report of Civil Aviation - 1

Report No. 18 of 2011 – Performance Audit of Civil Aviation in India of Union Government, Ministry of Civil Aviation, Date on which Report Tabled:Thu 08 Sep, 2011

Air India Limited (AIL) and Indian Airlines Ltd. (IAL) dominated the Indian aviation industry till the mid-1990's, when as part of the open sky policy, the Government of India (Gol) ended their monopoly in air transport services, and allowed private operators to provide airtransport services. The declining market share of IAL in domestic airtransport services was further compounded by the Gol's liberalised policy on bilateral entitlements with foreign countries from 2004-05 onwards, and permitting private Indian carriers to fly on international routes, which put pressure on the international operations of AIL and IAL.

After IAL and AIL (as well as Air India Charters Ltd. (AICL), the Low Cost Carrier subsidiary of Air India) undertook massive fleet acquisitions of Airbus and Boeing aircraft respectively in 2005, a proposal for merger of the two airlines was initiated and completed in August 2007 with their amalgamation into the National Aviation Company of India Ltd. (NACIL); this Company was subsequently renamed as "Air India" in November 2010.

Almost immediately after the merger, NACIL faced significant financial problems, which continued to multiply manifold, resulting in acute cash flow and working capital problems. This forced Air India (Al) to approach the Gol repeatedly for financial support. Further, the actual merger of the operational activities of IAL and AIL took unduly long, and is still not complete in many respects.

Audit Report 18 of 2011

From the archives : Merger of Air India and Indian Airlines

2.12.7 Merger of Air India and Indian Airlines - Government of India approved the merger of Air India and Indian Airlines in March 2007. Consequent to the above, a new company viz., National Aviation Company of India Limited (NACIL) was incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. However, in Statement No.11 of the Finance Accounts of 2009-10, Air India with an investment of ` 153.84 crore, Indian Airlines with investment of ` 432.14 crore and NACIL with investment of ` 800.05 crore are being shown as separate companies. Though the scheme of amalgamation of Air India Limited and Indian Airlines Limited with National Aviation Company of India Limited was approved by the Board of Directors of all the three companies, in the Union Finance Accounts for the year 2009-10 they are being shown as three separate PSUs. This issue was also highlighted in the last year’s Audit Report but no discernible progress has yet been noticed nor has this been explained. 

Comment on Accounts

Report No. 1 of 2010 - Compliance Audit on Accounts, Union Government (Civil) Date on which Report Tabled: Fri 18 Mar, 2011 

Understanding The Revolution In Inflight Connectivity | Check 6 Podcast

Aviation Week editors covering commercial aviation and space convene to discuss how and why airlines are increasingly offering fast inflight Wi-Fi for free. Watch Jens Flottau, Christine Boynton, Thierry Dubois and Robert Wall break it down as they record an episode of the Check 6 Podcast.

The podcast episode delves into the rapidly evolving market of inflight connectivity, particularly focusing on the impact of low Earth orbit (LEO) constellations like Starlink and Amazon Leo. These technologies are revolutionizing the passenger experience by offering faster and more reliable internet services on flights. 

The discussion highlights the shift in business models, with airlines moving towards offering free Wi-Fi to enhance customer loyalty rather than relying on ancillary revenue. This change is driven by increasing customer expectations for seamless connectivity, akin to what they experience at home or in the office. The conversation also touches on the technical aspects of LEO satellites, which, due to their proximity to Earth, provide lower latency compared to traditional geostationary satellites. However, these LEO satellites have a shorter lifespan, necessitating frequent updates, which can also be seen as an opportunity for technological advancements. 

The episode concludes with a discussion on future technologies, such as laser communications, which promise even greater bandwidth but are still in the experimental phase. Overall, the podcast provides an overview of the current state and future prospects of inflight connectivity, emphasizing the benefits for both airlines and passengers.

Key Topics:

1. Evolution of Inflight Connectivity
2. Impact of LEO Constellations
3. Shift in Airline Business Models
4. Technical Advantages of LEO Satellites
5. Competitive Landscape in Connectivity
6. Future of Laser Communications
7. Passenger Expectations and Experience
8. Technological Advancements and Challenges

Current Airline Operators in India - April 2026

Mainline (Scheduled Passenger Airlines)
Air India
Air India Express
IndiGo
SpiceJet
Akasa Air

---

Regional Airlines

Alliance Air
Fly91
IndiaOne Air
Star Air

---

Cargo Airlines
Afcom Holdings
Blue Dart Aviation
Pradhaan Air Express
Quikjet Airlines

---

Charter & Helicopter Services

Club One Air
Deccan Charters
Global Vectra Helicorp
JetSetGo
Pawan Hans
TajAir
Karnavati Aviation
India Fly Safe Aviation
Halo Airways
Pinnacle Air
Sirius India Airlines

The Many Lives of Indian Aviation

India’s aviation history is not a straight line of progress. It is a cycle-of creation, expansion, stress, and disappearance. Across nearly a century, airlines have taken off with promise, only to land-sometimes gently through mergers, often abruptly through collapse.

Beginnings Before the Republic (Pre-1953 Consolidation)

In the early decades, aviation in India was a scattered enterprise. Private carriers such as Indian National Airways, Deccan Airways, Bharat Airways, and Himalayan Aviation connected cities in a newly awakening market. These airlines did not fail in the conventional sense. Instead, in 1953, the government reorganized the sector, nationalizing airlines and merging most into Indian Airlines.

Kalinga Airlines, founded shortly after independence, lasted longer than many of its peers, continuing operations until 1967. But by then, the era of private fragmentation had already given way to state control.

These airlines operated in a fragmented, early aviation market and were largely merged during nationalization in 1953:

Indian National Airways (1932-1953)

Deccan Airways (1945-1953)

Bharat Airways (1946-1953)

Himalayan Aviation (1948-1953)

Kalinga Airlines (1947-1967)

---

The Quiet Years of State Control (1953-1990s)

From 1953 until the early 1990s, Indian aviation was largely a public-sector domain. Indian Airlines handled domestic operations, while Air India served international routes. The system was stable, but tightly controlled.

One notable experiment during this time was Vayudoot, launched in 1981 to improve regional connectivity. It ceased operations in 1997, reflecting the challenges of sustaining low-demand routes even under state backing.

Dominated by government carriers, with limited experimentation:

Indian Airlines (1953-2011) (later merged into Air India)

Vayudoot (1981-1997)

---

Liberalization and the First Private Wave (1990s-early 2000s)

Economic reforms in the early 1990s transformed the aviation landscape. Private airlines entered the market in quick succession. East-West Airlines, Damania Airways, ModiLuft, NEPC Airlines, and Skyline NEPC all began operations within a short span.

Many of these carriers exited just as quickly—most within a few years. The market was open, but not yet mature. Capital was limited, regulatory frameworks were evolving, and competition intensified faster than the industry could stabilize.

Two airlines from this era stood apart. Jet Airways, founded in 1993, grew into a dominant private carrier and operated for over two decades. Air Sahara, also launched in 1993, continued until it was acquired by Jet Airways in 2007.

A surge of private entrants following economic reforms:

Jet Airways (1993-2019)

Air Sahara (1993-2007) (later acquired by Jet Airways)

East-West Airlines (1992-1996)

Damania Airways (1993-1997)

ModiLuft (1993-1996)

NEPC Airlines (1993-1997)

Skyline NEPC (1996-1997)

---

The Era of Scale and Ambition (2003-2012)

The 2000s saw a new wave-this time driven by scale and branding. Air Deccan pioneered the low-cost model in India, operating from 2003 to 2012 and expanding access to air travel.

Kingfisher Airlines, also launched in 2003, pursued a different path. It emphasized premium service while expanding rapidly. By 2012, it had ceased operations, marking one of the most visible shutdowns in Indian aviation.

Paramount Airways, focused on specific regional routes, operated between 2005 and 2010 before discontinuing services.

This period demonstrated that both low-cost and premium strategies could falter under financial and operational pressures

Expansion-driven growth, with both low-cost and premium strategies:

Air Deccan (2003-2012)

Kingfisher Airlines (2003-2012)

Paramount Airways (2005-2010)

---

Regional Connectivity Experiments (2010s)

In the 2010s, several smaller airlines attempted to serve regional markets. Air Pegasus, Air Mantra, Air Carnival, and Air Odisha all launched with the aim of connecting underserved cities.

Their operational timelines were brief ranging from about one to a few years. The challenges were consistent: limited demand, infrastructure constraints, and funding difficulties. Despite policy support for regional connectivity, sustainability remained elusive.

Short-lived airlines focused on underserved routes:

Air Pegasus (2007-2016)

Air Mantra (2012-2013)

Air Carnival (2016-2017)

Air Odisha (2016-2018)

---

Consolidation and Structural Stress (2010s-2020s)

By the late 2010s and early 2020s, even established carriers faced difficulties. Jet Airways ceased operations in 2019 after years of financial strain. Its subsidiary, JetLite, also ended operations the same year.

Go First, which had operated since 2005, stopped flying in 2023 and entered liquidation.

Meanwhile, some airlines exited not through collapse but through integration. Indian Airlines was merged into Air India, ending its separate existence in 2011. Air Sahara had earlier been absorbed into Jet Airways. More recently, AIX Connect was merged into Air India Express.

Large-scale failures, mergers, and restructuring:

Jet Airways (1993-2019)

JetLite (1991-2019)

Go First (2005-2023)

Indian Airlines (merged into Air India, ceased separate identity in 2011)

Air Sahara (merged into Jet Airways in 2007)

AIX Connect (merged into Air India Express)

---

An Industry That Resets Itself

Merged/absorbed airlines: Indian National Airways, Deccan Airways, Bharat Airways, Himalayan Aviation, Air Sahara, Indian Airlines, AIX Connect

Financial collapse cases: Kingfisher Airlines, Jet Airways, Go First

Short-lived regional attempts: Air Mantra, Air Carnival, Air Odisha

Long-duration but eventually defunct: Jet Airways, Indian Airlines

Across different eras, the reasons vary, but the pattern persists.

Some airlines disappear through policy decisions, as in the nationalization of the 1950s. Others exit due to financial distress, as seen with Kingfisher Airlines, Jet Airways, and Go First. Still others merge into larger entities, their identities fading while operations continue under new names.

Short-lived regional carriers highlight another dimension-ambition constrained by economics.

What emerges from this history is not simply a list of failures, but a recurring reset. New entrants continue to appear, even as predecessors exit. Each phase reflects the conditions of its time—policy shifts, market maturity, cost structures, and competitive intensity.

India’s aviation sector has expanded significantly in scale and reach. Yet, its history shows that growth has rarely been smooth, and longevity has never been guaranteed.

The skies have always had room for new airlines.

But not always for long.

The Runways They Left Behind: Inside India’s erstwhile Airline Organisations and Lost Air Routes

There was a time when the skies over India were more crowded with ambition than with aircraft.

In the early decades of aviation, before independence had fully reshaped the nation, carriers like Indian National Airways and Deccan Airways stitched together distant cities. They flew not just passengers, but the idea that India could be connected end-to-end by air. Their journeys, however, did not end in failure but in absorption—many were folded into what would become the state-controlled system, eventually forming the backbone of Indian Airlines.

For years, the skies were quieter, more centralized. Then came the 1990s.

Liberalization opened the gates.

Airlines began appearing with new names, new promises, and new business models. Some arrived with modest fleets and regional dreams—Air Mantra, Air Pegasus, Air Carnival—airlines that flew briefly, connecting smaller cities before fading out within a few years of operation. Their timelines were short, but their intent was clear: to democratize flight.

Others arrived with scale and swagger.

Jet Airways, founded in 1993, rose steadily to become one of India’s most prominent private carriers. For over two decades, it defined premium private aviation in the country. Its grounding in 2019 marked not just the end of an airline, but the closing of a long chapter in Indian aviation history.

Kingfisher Airlines entered differently-bold, branded, and highly visible. Launched in 2003, it expanded rapidly, blending luxury positioning with aggressive growth. By 2012, operations had ceased, leaving behind one of the most widely discussed collapses in the industry.

Not all exits were collapses.

Some airlines disappeared through transformation. Air Sahara did not vanish; it became part of Jet Airways. Indian Airlines itself did not end abruptly; it merged into Air India, consolidating state aviation. More recently, AIX Connect was merged into Air India Express, continuing a pattern where names disappear but operations are absorbed and reshaped.

And then there are the more recent silences.

Go First, once an active low-cost carrier, ceased operations in 2023 and entered liquidation. Its story, like many before it, reflects the persistent pressures of the aviation business-costs, competition, and constraints that have outlasted multiple generations of airlines.

Across decades, the list grows long.

Some airlines lasted for decades, others for just a year or two. Some ended in mergers, others in financial distress, and a few simply faded away after brief attempts to take flight.

Yet, taken together, they form a different kind of map-not of routes flown, but of risks taken.

Each defunct airline marks a moment when someone believed there was still space in the sky.

And for a while, there was.

Defunct Airlines of India (Years of Operation)

Air India Cargo (1932-2012), Air Mantra (2012-2013), Air Pegasus (2007-2016), Air Carnival (2016-2017), Air Odisha (2016-2018), Air Dravida (2003-2005), Air Deccan (2003-2012), Deccan 360 (2009-2013), East-West Airlines (1992-1996), Damania Airways (1993-1997), ModiLuft (1993-1996), NEPC Airlines (1993-1997), Skyline NEPC (1996-1997), Paramount Airways (2005-2010), Kingfisher Airlines (2003-2012), Jet Airways (1993-2019), JetLite (1991-2019), Air Sahara (1993-2007), Vayudoot (1981-1997), Indian National Airways (1932-1953), Deccan Airways (1945-1953), Himalayan Aviation (1948-1953), Bharat Airways (1946-1953), Kalinga Airlines (1947-1967), Indian Airlines (1953-2011), Go First (2005-2023)

The privatised Air India is still suffering !

Air India is confronting a deepening financial and leadership crisis, with projected FY26 losses soaring to ₹20,000 crore—well above both earlier estimates and the previous year’s ₹11,000 crore. While external shocks, including airspace disruptions, elevated fuel prices, and the Ahmedabad crash, have significantly strained operations, they do not fully explain the scale of the downturn. The more pressing concern is whether the airline built adequate financial buffers to navigate such volatility.

The challenge has been compounded by the exit of CEO Campbell Wilson, leaving Tata Group to steer both leadership transition and turnaround strategy simultaneously. Losses exceeding ₹16,000 crore within nine months had already pointed to a record annual deficit. Although Wilson highlighted progress in consolidating four airlines, upgrading systems, and enhancing service standards, these efforts have yet to translate into operational stability. With an ambitious order of 570 aircraft in the pipeline, the airline now faces the dual test of restoring financial discipline while rebuilding credibility.

The Beginnings

In 1952, the condition of all the airlines witnessed a general deterioration all over the world. To rescue the airline sector of the country, the Planning Commission of India recommended the merger of all the scheduled airlines into a single integrated corporation.

At first, the Government of India favoured the establishment of one single corporation to handle the air transport of the nation but later it revised its decision to establish two separate air corporations.

Air Corporation Act, 1953, gave monopoly power to Indian Airlines to operate on domestic scheduled services ruling out any other operator. Similarly, Air India International became the single Indian carrier to operate on international routes expect flights to some neighbouring countries which were given to Indian Airlines.

While Air India International did not see any major problems of organisation, personnel or morale, the route was not smooth for Indian Airlines as it was a difficult task to fit in eight varieties of separate managerial and supervisory staff into its unified cadres of management.

Also, these airlines had different scales of pay and conditions of services, so it was also a challenge to mould all these units into one single integrated organisation with uniform standards of operation, administration and of course uniform scale pay.

The Air Corporation Act was passed by Parliament in March 1953 nationalising all airlines and approved by the President of India on May 28th 1953. Air India International took over the International routes of the nation. Indian Airlines Corporation started operations in the Domestic routes. Both Airlines commenced operations from August 1,1953

More updates on the Beginnings will appear on the same page

The Epilogue

We are right in the throes of turning back the clock in Indian Civil Aviation. 

Air India is being sold to private bidders as the policy makers are of the firm opinion that running an Airline is not a Government's business. It was in the year 1953 that many small airlines were merged into two quasi government public sector entities - Indian Airlines Corporation catering the domestic routes and Air India International operating to foreign destinations. 

In the year 2007 both these companies amalgamated into one national carrier Air India Limited. Ever since the fortunes of the company declined to a point of no return and the Government desperately wanted to jettison the Airline to private hands to save tax payer's money. 

On the Airline Industry in India one is reminded of this famous quotation of Charles Dickens, the famous English novelist from his "A Tale of Two Cities" : 

"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to heaven, we were all going direct the other way” 

To put things in perspective elsewhere in the world "Deregulation" of the Airline Industry was first carried out in the United States of America between the years 1978 to 1986. Essentially this meant opening the skies for all Airlines to operate without any restrictions. 

Alfred E. Kahn is widely viewed as the father of Airline Deregulation in the United States. He said in an interview that "Instability is the price we pay for competition". Kahn authored a seminal book "Lessons from Deregulation Telecommunications and Airlines after the Crunch" in which he chronicled the history of Airline Deregulation in the U.S.A, from its inception and aftermath. 

We intend to chronicle the history of Civil Aviation in India between 1953 and now. This is the best time to look at history and fit the events in a larger map. Perhaps we can then learn the trends and the future trajectory of the Civil Aviation in India. 

Join us in our journey